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N.

DAVID PALMETER*

Torquemada and the Tariff Act:
The Inquisitor Rides Again
Imagine a system of civil litigation in which a party serves a massive
discovery request, consisting of interrogatories and requests for production
of documents. Imagine further that the serving party has the sole authority
to prescribe the time within which response must be made and the format
(such as to require multiple copies and translation into English of all requested documents originally prepared in a foreign language). Imagine still
further that the serving party is the sole judge of the adequacy of the
response and of the merits of all objections as to relevancy or burdensomeness of the request; that the serving party also is the imposer of sanctions for
failure to comply, and the ultimate decision-maker in the underlying matter
for which the information is sought.
Such a system would be intolerable in the state or federal courts of the
United States. It would raise serious questions of due process in a system of
administrative law that separates the investigative from the judicial function
within a single agency. But this is the inquisitorial system that was ordained
by Congress for the administration of the antidumping and countervailing
duty provisions of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff Act).' Torquemada, no doubt, would be right at home with it. But this is hardly a
recommendation for the system. 2 It should be changed.

*Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander and Ferdon, Washington, D.C. A.B. Syracuse
University; J.D. University of Chicago. Member, District of Columbia and New York State
Bars.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 150, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Tariff
Act].
2. Tomas de Torquemada was the first Inquisitor-General of the Spanish Inquisition, a man
"whose name has become a byword for cruelty and severity." W. BENET, THE READER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 500

(1968).
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I. Title VII of the Tariff Act
Title VII, pertaining to countervailing and antidumping duties, was added
to the Tariff Act of 1930 by Title I of the Trade Act of 1979. 3 A countervail-

ing duty is imposed to offset-or to "countervail"-subsidies paid on products exported to the United States.4 An antidumping duty is imposed to

offset any margin of "dumping" of imported merchandise. This is the
amount by which the price of the merchandise to the United States is less
than "fair" value. 5 The determination of whether imported merchandise is
benefitting from subsidies or is being sold at less than fair value is made by
the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) .6

Normally, countervailing duty and antidumping proceedings are initiated
when an interested party-usually a U.S. producer, trade association, or
labor union-files a petition on behalf of an industry alleging the elements
necessary for the imposition of the duty. The petition must contain information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations. Commerce, within twenty days of its filing, must determine whether the petition
meets these requirements, and, if so, commence an investigation to deter-

mine whether a subsidy is being provided or whether sales below fair value
are taking place. If the ultimate determination of Commerce is affirmative,
and if the United States International Trade Commission determines that an
industry in the United States is being materially injured thereby, then the
countervailing or antidumping duty will be imposed.7 It is the inquisitorial
investigative procedure established by Title VII, and administered by Commerce, with which this article takes issue.
A.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

Title VII investigations are characterized by massive amounts of data that
must be obtained and presented within an extremely short period of time.

3. See Tariff Act, supra note 1.
4. Tariff Act § 701, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. III 1985).
5. Tariff Act § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1985).
6. Tariff Act § 701 and 731, supra. The same provisions require the United States International Trade Commission to determine whether an industry in the United States is materially
injured or is threatened with material injury or if the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded by reason of imports of merchandise that is subsidized or sold at
less than fair value. Such a determination is necessary before countervailing or antidumping
duties may be imposed, except countervailing duties may be levied on imports from certain
countries without an injury determination. See Tariff Act § 701(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c) (Supp.
11 1985).
7. The regulations of the Department of Commerce with regard to countervailing and
antidumping duty investigations are set out at 19 C.F.R. Part 355 and Part 353 (1985) respectively.
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The procedures are complex. After commencement of an investigation,
Title VII calls for a preliminary and a final determination by Commerce in
both countervailing and antidumping proceedings. In a "normal" countervailing duty investigation, Commerce must reach a preliminary determination within 85 days of the filing of a petition, and a final determination within
75 days of the preliminary determination. In a "normal" antidumping
investigation, the preliminary determination must be reached within 160
days of the filing of the petition and the final determination also must be
made within 75 days of the preliminary determination. Thus, in a "normal"
countervailing duty investigation, Commerce must reach its final determination in less than 6 months from the filing of the petition (85 days to the
preliminary and 75 days to the final determination, or 160 days total); in a
"normal" antidumping investigation, Commerce has less than 8 months to
reach a final determination (160 days to the preliminary determination and
75 days to the final determination, or 235 days total). 8
These severe time limits, coupled with the magnitude of the task Commerce and the investigated foreign parties must accomplish within them,
have contributed to the situation described at the outset of this article and
seriously call into question the very fairness and justice of the system itself.
B.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PROCEDURES

Before reaching a preliminary determination in a Title VII proceeding,
Commerce analyzes the petition and its allegations and prepares a detailed
questionnaire. In a countervailing duty investigation, the questionnaire
normally is presented to the appropriate foreign embassy in Washington,
D.C.; in an antidumping investigation, presentation usually is made to the
foreign companies concerned through the U.S. embassy in the particular
country concerned.
A "standard" Commerce questionnaire in a countervailing duty investigation calls for data from many different agencies of the foreign government and from most, if not all, producing and exporting companies in the
foreign country for the past year, plus any completed quarters since the close
of the year. Two years of tax data usually are required. All information
submitted must be in English or be accompanied by a translation. This

8. These time limits are set out in Tariff Act, §§ 703 and 705, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b and 1671d
(countervailing) (Supp. III 1985) and §§ 733 and 735, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (antidumping) (1982).
They apply to a "normal" case. Commerce may extend for 65 days the deadline for its
preliminary countervailing duty determination, and for 50 days the deadline for its preliminary
antidumping investigation, if it determines the cases are extraordinarily complicated. Commerce may also extend its antidumping final determination by 60 days in certain circumstances.
SPRING 1986
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includes all relevant laws, decrees and regulations. All of this must be
submitted in 10 copies within 30 days.9
A "standard" antidumping questionnaire requires data for a six-month
period covering all sales to the United States and in the home market.
Commerce requires the data to be on computer tape in mandatory formats,
and will accept only IBM-compatible computer tapes. Exporters who have
acquired Sperry-Univac, Hewlett-Packard, Control Data or other U.S.
brands are-by Commerce requirements-out of luck.' 0
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Final determinations by Commerce in countervailing and antidumping
investigations are subject to review in the Court of International Trade
which employs the normal standard of review of administrative proceedings: whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence on the
record and is otherwise in accordance with law." Decisions of the Court of
International Trade are reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and, upon writ of certiorari,by the Supreme Court.12
II. The Problem
The system described at the outset of this article flows from the statutory
and regulatory process ordained for countervailing and antidumping investigations: establishment within a single agency of the dual responsibility of

9. See, e.g., Countervailing Duty Questionnaire, Oil Country Tubular Goods from the
Republic of Korea, Inv. No. C-580-402, July 13, 1984. This consists of 44 single-spaced
typewritten pages. The cover letter of the same date, to the Commercial Attache, Embassy of
Korea, states: ". . . we are requesting that the government of Korea, the Korean producers
which export the subject merchandise to the United States, and trading companies which
export or import the subject merchandise to the United States, provide complete answers to all
questions ... we further request that (10) copies of each response be forwarded to this office by
August 13, 1984." (It is worth noting that the date of presentation of the questionnaire, July 13,
was Friday the 13th, unlucky for the respondents because the first two days of the 30 were a
weekend, making transmittal to Korea more difficult than it otherwise might have been during
regular business days.) The cover letter also provides, "All information submitted in response
to this questionnaire should be in English." (Documents available in public file, Inv. No.
C-580-402, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration.)
10. See, e.g., Antidumping Request for Information, Nylon Impression Fabric, Japan, July
25, 1985, Appendix III, A-588-502 (DOC Public File): "The tape should be 9-track and can
have a density of either 800, 1600 or 6250 BPI. Since the Department cannot translate ASCII
data, the coding requirements are quite specific and must be followed. The characters must be
coded either EBCDIC or BCD alphanumeric." In computer-ese, the author is informed, this
means IBM-compatible. In one case of which the author is aware, a foreign exporter, having
acquired a U.S.-made Univac computer, was required to bear the considerable expense of
completely re-entering its information onto a machine whose data DOC could "translate."
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (Supp. III 1985); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
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investigation and determination without the intervention of any independent entity. This is the essence of the inquisitorial system: "conversion of the
judge from an impartial referee into an active inquisitor who is free to seek
evidence and to control the nature and objectives of the inquiry." 13 The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the agency concerned
is one that also
14
plays an important role in trade policy formulation.
Utilization of government personnel to investigate and to establish a
petitioner's case is of obvious benefit to petitioners, since they are relieved
of a large measure of the cost that would otherwise be incurred. More
significantly, petitioners, having caused an investigation to begin, have the
luxury of sitting back, letting someone else carry the burden, and criticizing
the results, whatever they are. Petitioners may, directly or indirectly,
attempt to apply pressure on the working level at Commerce by complaining
to higher policy officials of the efforts made or of the results achieved: the
less than fair value margins are not high enough; the true nature of the
subsidy has not been ascertained; the verification is not adequate. If such
tactics are not fruitful, petitioners have available a judicial challenge to the
determination of Commerce on the ground that it is not supported by
substantial evidence on the record or is otherwise not in accordance with
law.
On the other hand, the system also is laden with potential frustration for
petitioners who, believing that they are being injured by unfairly traded
imports, have gone to the trouble and expense of making a presumptive case
sufficient to start an investigation. They then must sit back and watch others
prosecute their case. From the petitioner's point of view, they may suggest,
they may argue, they may cajole and plead, but they never can control the
prosecution of the proceeding they have launched. Understandably, peti-.
tioners and their counsel may believe that they could do a better job than
Commerce of ferretting out the precise nature and extent of the alleged
unfair practices involved. Frustration in this situation certainly is understandable.
Whether petitioners are frustrated or not, the system places Commerce in
an unenviable position-it is supposed to be at once the official, impartial
judge and the thorough, relentless investigator for petitioners. It must go
out and attempt to make the case for petitioners once the latter have
overcome the minimal thresholds necessary to begin the process. No matter
what Commerce does, no matter what it accomplishes in the brief period of
time allotted, the agency always is subject to the allegation that it did not do
enough. If one had set out to give a government agency a mission that is

13. J.

MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION

135 (1969).

14. See notes 46 to 48, infra, and accompanying text.
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subject, by its very nature, to relentless second guessing, it would be difficult
to do better than this.
The impact on foreign respondents is predictable. Commerce seeks to
leave no stone unturned, understandably desiring to do as thorough an
investigation as possible-to say nothing of its responding to criticism and
pressure generated by petitioners. But the burden of turning over the stones
is placed upon respondents. The burden can range from the seriously
harrassing to the impossible. Frequently, for example, respondents are
asked to prove the negative. 15 Much of the information respondents are
required to produce results not from the need of Commerce to obtain
evidence on which it will reach its judicially reviewable determination;
rather, the required production results from a perfectly understandable
bureaucratic desire on the part of Commerce to cover every possible base in
order to protect itself from criticism by petitioners. Respondents who balk
at the demands of Commerce, or who cannot comply, risk being branded as
uncooperative or unresponsive, and risk paying the price of having Commerce use the16"best information available," i.e., petitioners' allegations,
against them.
Respondents have no effective appeal from the requirements imposed
unilaterally by Commerce. There is, at the administrative stage, no independent arbiter of the reasonableness, the burdensomeness, the relevance of
the requirements imposed by Commerce. The agency alone determines the
nature and extent of the requirements that will be imposed on respondents,
whether respondents have complied adequately, whether respondents'
answers have been verified, what sanctions will be imposed for perceived
failure of respondents to meet the demands of Commerce. 17 And, after
conducting the investigation, Commerce then reaches a quasi-judicial final
determination. Respondents, to be sure, have access to the Court of International Trade for review of an adverse final determination under the
substantial evidence test. But the utility of this right is doubtful when
Commerce has the power to exclude from the record to be reviewed by the
court information supplied by respondents on the ground that the informa15. See, e.g., Government Verification Outline, Countervailing Duty Investigations, Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Sri Lanka, C-542-401, (DOC Public File): (1).
"Demonstrate that the GCEC does not build factories within the zone for lease to investors."
(2). "Demonstrate that IPZ companies are not eligible for any benefits under this program."
(3). "Demonstrate that there has been no individual assistance to exporters of the subject
merchandise to the United States from EDB under this program." (4). "Demonstrate that the
Government of Sri Lanka does not have a textile self-sufficiency program."
16. Tariff Act § 776,19 U.S.C. § 1677e (Supp. III 1985). H.R. REP. No. 96-317,96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 77 (1979).
17. Of course, petitioners may believe that Commerce is not going far enough in attempting
to obtain information from respondents. In such cases, they share the essential powerlessness of
respondents in dealing with the dictates of Commerce.
VOL. 20, NO. 2
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tion is not in8conformity with the administrative requirements imposed by
Commerce.'
III. A Proposed Solution

Title VII of the Tariff Act is not the only provision of the trade laws
dealing with so-called "unfair competition." Section 337 of the Act prohibits
"unfair methods of competition and unfair acts." The procedures employed
in Section 337 investigations are not inquisitorial; rather, they are the
adversarial procedures characteristic of traditional common law litigation.

They suggest a model for Title VII proceedings as well. 1 9
A.

THE SECTION

337

MODEL

A Section 337 investigation begins with the filing of a complaint with the
United States International Trade Commission (ITC) which, within 30 days,
must determine if the complaint is properly filed; if so, the ITC must initiate
the investigation and serve all alleged violators as soon as possible. Responses are due in 20 days. 20 Upon initiation, the matter is referred to an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presides through the discovery and
hearing phase of the investigation. Following a hearing, the ALJ reaches an
Initial Determination which will become the Final Determination of the ITC

unless the ITC orders review. The ITC may grant requests for review in
whole or in part, and may order review on its own motion.
ITC remedy orders against offending imports are subject to disapproval
by the President within 60 days. 2 ' During the period allotted for presidential
18. See, e.g., Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Certain Stainless
Steel Sheet and Strip Products From the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 56529.
19. Tariff Act § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982) (Section 337). The undesirable costs to
government of Title VII proceedings-both the costs of administration and the costs of
increased intergovernmental confrontations-are further reasons for utilization of a private
litigation approach. See Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions
of the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1361 (1979). Ehrenhaft, the administrator of the countervailing duty and antidumping regimes before the effective date of Title VII, raises serious questions concerning the
wisdom of opting for the present elaborate process administered by the executive branch as
opposed to the policy-oriented process that applied previously. Viewing antidumping proceedings in particular as essentially private in nature, Ehrenhaft suggests transfer to the courts might
be more appropriate and less costly to government than the Title VII process. For a persuasive
argument that, as to dumping at least, there should be no regime, inquisitorial or otherwise, see
Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the TariffAct of 1930, 13 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681 (1981).

20. The regulations of the ITC dealing with § 337 investigations are set forth in 19 U.S.C.
Part § 210 (1985).
21. If the ITC determines that § 337 has been violated, it may issue an order to exclude
imports of the offending merchandise, or it may order a party to cease the unfair activities.
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review, imports may enter under bond. Appeals from ITC Final Determinations are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with
Supreme Court review possible by way of writ of certiorari.22
The record in a Section 337 proceeding is made by the parties pursuant to
rules of evidence under a procedure strongly resembling civil litigation.
There is a significant difference however, in that ITC regulations provide for
the assignment to each proceeding of an investigative attorney who is a
party, and who is entitled to participate fully in all phases of the caseincluding initiation of discovery and participation in the hearing. This staff
participation insures public sector presence in these potentially sensitive
proceedings and suggests a continued important role for government staff in
Title VII investigations under the litigation model suggested here. 23

B. A

BASIC PROCEDURE FOR

TITLE

VII

INVESTIGATIONS

1. Complaint and Response
A Title VII proceeding would begin with the filing of a complaint which,
like present Title VII and Section 337 complaints, is more than a notice
pleading. 24 All aspects of alleged violations should be set out with specificity
along with the names and addresses of all alleged violators. Upon a decision
to initiate the administering agency should assume responsibility for service
upon alleged violators, who would be required to respond to the detailed
25
complaint.
2. Discovery
The major difference between present Title VII proceedings and those
that would occur under the proposed method of adjudication would be in
the fact development phase of the case. Presently this is accomplished by
government inquisitorial investigation. Under a Section 337 type system it
would be accomplished by the parties using all of the apparatus available
through civil discovery proceedings, including interrogatories, requests for

Section 337 remedies would not be appropriated substitutes for antidumping or countervailing
duties.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
23. The role of the ITC investigative attorney to represent the public interest in a proceeding
between private parties has a counterpart in some civil law jurisdictions where public prosecutors, in addition to prosecuting criminal cases, also represent the public interest in non-criminal
proceedings between private parties. MERRYMAN, supra note 13, at 111.
24. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1985).
25. 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.16,210.8 (1985). For reasons set out below, the ITC is suggested as the
most appropriate administering government agency. See infra notes 42 to 48, and accompanying text.
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production of documents and depositions. 26 Complainants, vested with the
full panoply of discovery techniques, would acquire a vastly increased
measure of control over the development of their own cases. So would, by
the same token, respondents, who would be equally free to develop relevant27
information, particularly that relating to the question of material injury.
Through use of discovery techniques-such as document production requests-complainants could obtain (under appropriate protective order)
raw pricing information from
respondents, from which they could develop
28
and argue their own case.
Under the present inquisitorial system, this information is obtained by
Commerce through questionnaire responses which are "verified" by on-site
inspection. Complainants, who are not present, must accept what Commerce obtains and deems verified. Issues of credibility, for example, are
determined by Commerce based upon its evaluation of the results of its own
investigation. A complainant who would have evaluated evidence differ-

ently is left to argue with a fact-finder who was "there" and clearly has a
superior claim as to knowledge of what occurred. In the proposed adjudicatory process, by contrast, a complainant would present its case to an independent weigher of the evidence, the ALJ. This system would at once place

the burden of proof on complainant and give to complainant a better
opportunity to develop its own case.
What of respondents under such a system? There are some clear disadvantages: complainant's counsel would have access to extremely sensitive
data of respondents, to the books and records themselves. Presently com-

26. 19 C.F.R. Part 210, Subpart D (1985). The ITC General Counsel has taken the position
that § 337 proceedings are administrative proceedings, not judicial, and therefore are not
subject to the provisions of The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. ITC General Counsel Memorandum GC-81-144, Oct. 9, 1981.
27. This would be a significant contrast from-and improvement over-present ITC procedures which place respondents at a marked disadvantage. The ITC investigation is carried on by
the agency's staff largely on the basis of confidential responses to questionnaires. None of the
information thus furnished to the ITC need be verified and, in practice, none is verified.
Moreover, respondents have extremely limited access to business confidential information
submitted by petitioners in support of an affirmative injury determination. While the ITC may
disclose to a party, under protective order, any confidential information submitted by any other
party, Tariff Act § 777(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. 1677f(c)(1), (Supp. III 1985), it rarely does so. If it
declines to disclose, the judiciary, on appeal, may order production only of information
submitted in support of a petition concerning domestic price or cost of production. Tariff Act
§ 777(c)(2), 19 U.S.C. 1677f(c)(2) (1982). Such information pertaining to the respondents is the
core of a fair value investigation before Commerce, but it generally is meaningless at the ITC
where the indicia of injury-production, profits, employment etc.-are of much greater
relevance.
28. Such a proceeding might bear a strong resemblance to litigation under the RobinsonPatman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21a (1982).
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plainant's counsel have only limited access. 29 Respondent's employees
would be subject to oral deposition under oath and to cross-examination
should they testify at a hearing. By contrast, at present only Commerce
officials may interview respondents in an informal manner; complainant's
counsel has no access to these witnesses. Under the proposed system,
respondents would be subject to direct discovery from complainant's counsel, rather than having that contact controlled and filtered by Commerce.
Yet it is suggested that under an adjudicatory system respondents would
benefit from significant protections that they presently do not have: the
power of the ALJ to control discovery and to prevent abuse. The key is the
independence of the ALJ. A party that believes a discovery request is not
proper would have the option of refusing to comply. In the suggested
Section 337 style proceeding, as in ordinary civil litigation, the party seeking
disclosure could move the ALJ for an order to compel production.3 ° If the
order is granted, then of course, a party refusing to comply would be subject
to sanctions, and these could be as disadvantageous as "best evidence" now
employed by Commerce. 31 But the point is that the requesting party is not
the arbiter of the matter. That task resides where it should reside-with an
32
impartial judge.
3. Initial and Final Determinations
Presently in Title VII proceedings, preliminary and final determinations
are made both by Commerce as to the existence of a subsidy or sales at less
than fair value, and by the ITC as to material injury. These procedures
would adapt easily, with minor changes, to the initial determination and
final determination procedures of Section 337. Under Title VII, both the
preliminary and final determinations are made by the same entity, Commerce or the ITC.33 Under Section 337, the initial determination is made by
the ALJ, while the final determination is made by the ITC.34 Title VII cases

29. The access generally is to confidential information submitted in response to antidumping
duty and countervailing duty questionnaires. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.30, 355.20 (1985). Information
is exempt from disclosure if it relates to any matter which is required to be kept confidential
pursuant to privilege, statute or Executive Order. 19 C.F.R. § 353.31, 355.21 (1985).
30. 19 C.F.R. § 210.36(a) (1982); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
31. See, e.g., Certain Vinyl-Covered Foam Blocks, Inv. No. 337-TA-178, USITC Pub. 1604
(Nov. 1984); Certain Plastic Food Storage Containers, Inv. No. 337-TA-152, USITC Pub. 1563
(Aug. 1984).
32. Since neither party presumably would be anxious to appear frivolous before the ALJ,
motions to compel likely would not be overreaching, while refusals to comply likely would not
amount to "stonewalling."
33. Commerce makes both determinations as to the unfair practice and the ITC both
determinations as to injury.
34. The Initial Determination of the ALJ will become the Final Determination of the ITC
unless the ITC orders review, which may be requested by any party. Perhaps in response to the
VOL. 20, NO. 2
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could benefit from this procedure. In utilizing Section 337 as a model for
Title VII cases, the Title VII two-stage process would remain, but the initial
(or preliminary) determination would be that of the ALJ, following the
adversarial proceeding. This decision would deal both with material injury
and with the question of sales at less than fair value or subsidies. It would be
subject to review and subsequent modification or adoption as a final determination.
4. Appeals and PresidentialDisapproval

Adoption of Title VII investigations to the Section 337 model would not
necessitate a change in their avenues of judicial appeal, which, as noted, are
taken initially to the United States Court of International Trade and then to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 35 One major difference
between Section 337 and Title VII final determinations at present, however,
is that Section 337 allows for explicit Presidential disapproval, while Title

VII provides no authority for the President to intervene for policy reasons.
He may, within sixty days, disapprove of an ITC exclusion order or cease

and desist order37 in Section 337 cases. 36 If this occurs, the order is without

force or effect.
Prior to 1974, the President's Section 337 veto power was structured

differently. ITC orders did not take effect unless the President affirmatively
approved of them. A 1974 change in the law reversing this procedure and
providing that the ITC's orders automatically become final unless the President affirmatively takes steps to disapprove them, 38 has had the effect of
increasing greatly the number of exclusion orders issued. 39 The President

increased number of Section 337 cases, the ITC rarely initiates review on its own motion, and
increasingly has denied petitions for review thereby making the Initial Determination of the
ALJ the Final Determination of the ITC itself. See, e.g., Certain Heavy-Duty Staple Gun
Tackers, Inv. No. 337-TA-137, USITC Pub. 1506 (Mar. 1984); Certain Caulking Guns, Inv.
No. 337-TA-139, USITC Pub. 1507 (Mar. 1984).
35. See supra notes 11 and 12, and accompanying text.
36. § 337(g), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1982).
37. § 337(g)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982). During the President's sixty-day consideration, merchandise may be permitted to enter under bond. § 337(g)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(3)
(1982). If the President does not take affirmative action, the ITC order automatically becomes
final. § 337(g)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(4) (1982).
38. The ITC, prior to 1974, investigated in order to assist the President, who was charged
with determining if Section 337 was violated. The Trade Reform Act of 1974 gave the
responsibility to the ITC subject to Presidential veto, which was retained because "the granting
of relief against imports could have a very direct and substantial impact on United States foreign
relations, economic and political." TRADE REFORM AcT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 199 (1974).
39. From 1944 to 1969, no exclusion orders were issued. In 1969, in Furazolidone, the
President issued the first order since the early years of the law. Inv. No. 337-21 T.C. Pub. 299
(Nov. 1969). Two other exclusion orders were issued by the President in the early 1970's:
Lightweight Luggage, Inv. No. 337-28, T.C. Pub. 463 (Feb. 1972) and Pantyhose, Inv. No.
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does not frequently interfere for policy reasons in Section 337 cases. 40
It seems anomalous that in Section 337 proceedings (involving for the
most part such purely legal matters as infringement of copyrights, patents or
trademarks) the President is given a policy veto, while in Title VII proceedings (frequently involving matters of great foreign policy significance and
impact) the President has no such authority. 4' The experience of Presidential exercise of this authority under Section 337 suggests that its inclusion in
Title VII proceedings would not be misplaced and, more importantly, would
not be misused. 42 In any event, however, the case for adoption of Title VII

337-25, T.C. Pub. 471 (Mar. 1972). By contrast, as of September 3, 1985, 39 exclusion orders
were in effect. USITC, CALENDAR OF HEARINGS AND DEADLINE DATES FOR PENDING
INVESTIGATIONS 27 (Sept. 3, 1985).
40. One recent instance involved so-called "grey market" goods against which the Commission had issued an exclusion order. In Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, USITC
Pub. 1616 (Nov. 1984), the Commission determined that batteries produced abroad by a
subsidiary of the U.S. trademark owner, and legitimately bearing that trademark in foreign
commerce, infringed the U.S. trademark when imported by third parties. The President found
the Commission's determination "at odds with the longstanding regulatory interpretation"
adopted by the Treasury in administering the customs laws applicable to trademarked goods.
"The Administration has advanced the Treasury Department's interpretation in a number of
pending court cases," the President said. "Recent decisions of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia and the Court of International Trade explicitly uphold the Treasury
Department's interpretation. Allowing the Commission's determination in this case to stand
could be viewed as an alteration of that interpretation. I, therefore, have decided to disapprove
the Commission's determination." OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT REGARDING CERTAIN ALKALINE BATTERIES, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655
(1985). In addition, the President disapproved the Commission's determination in Certain
Headboxes and Paper Making Machine Forming Sections for the Continuous Production of
Paper and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-82, USITC Pub. 1138 (Apr. 1981). See 46
Fed. Reg. 32361 (1981). The President found the Exclusion Order issued by the Commission
too broad. Subsequently the Commission, on its own motion, initiated a second investigation,
again found a violation, and issued a narrower order, which was not disapproved by the
President. Certain Headboxes etc., Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, USITC Pub. 1197 (Nov. 1981).
Presidential disapproval and modification by the Commission of its order also occurred in
Certain Molded-in Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, Inv. No.
337-TA-99, USITC Pub. 1297 (Oct. 1982).
41. A clear example of the foreign policy significance and impact of Title VII cases are those
involving steel. For two decades trade in steel has created international problems, leading to
"voluntary" export restraints in the 1960's, the Trigger Price Mechanism of the 1970's, and
scores of antidumping and countervailing duty cases in the 1980's. See, Horlick & Savage, Steel
Trade Wars, 1968-84, How Washington Became the Center of U.S. Steel Trade, WORLD L.,
July-Aug. 1984, at 5.
42. The President is given the final word under the "escape clause" provisions of the Trade
Act of 1974 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. III 1985), in which the USITC, if it determines that
an industry is being seriously injured-or is threatened with serious injury-because of increased imports, recommends to the President a level of import restrictions designed to remedy
the injury. Similarly, the President is given the last word in market disruption cases under § 406
of the Trade Act of 1974 involving trade with non-market economies when the ITC, if it finds
market disruption, also recommends a level of protection to the President. 19 U.S.C. § 2436
(1982). This authority is significantly different from the President's authority under § 337.
Relief will not be granted under the "escape clause" or § 406 unless the President affirmatively
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to the Section 337 model does not hinge upon the inclusion of a Presidential
veto for policy reasons.
C. A

SINGLE AGENCY-

COMMERCE OR

ITC

Section 337 investigations are conducted entirely by a single agency, the
ITC. This includes the issue of substantive violation-an unfair trade practice-as well as the question of injury. Title VII proceedings, apparently
more for reasons of historic accident than anything else, are bifurcated.
Commerce decides the issue of substantive violation while the ITC deals
with matters of injury.43
There is no particular reason to continue the bifurcation. A single proceeding encompassing both aspects of a case before a single agency would be
more efficient and would comport more closely with the obligations of the
United States under the international Antidumping Code and Subsidies
Code. 44 It makes sense to assign responsibility for the complete investigation to the quasi-judicial ITC rather than to a policy-making and policyimplementing executive branch agency such as the Department of Com-

acts to provide a remedy. In § 337 proceedings, by contrast, a remedy will become effective
automatically unless the President acts to veto an ITC order.
43. Enforcement of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws originally was the responsibility of the Department of the Treasury. Presumably this resulted from the fact that Treasury
was the department that included the Customs Service, the agency charged with the collection
of duties, including antidumping and countervailing duties. Treasury's responsibilities were
transferred to the Department of Commerce by Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69173
(codified as a note at 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (Supp. III 1985)). See Palmeter & Kossl, Restructuring
Executive Branch Trade Responsibilities:A Half-Step Forward,12 LAW &POL'Y INT'L Bus. 611
(1980). Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, Ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (previously
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 etseq.) Treasury was responsible also for the injury determination
until 1954, when this was transferred to the ITC (then the Tariff Commission). Ch. 1213, tit. III,
68 Stat. 1138 (1954). Injury determinations were not required under the countervailing duty
laws before 1975, when injury was made a prerequisite for imposition of a countervailing duty
on otherwise duty-free merchandise. P.L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 190 (1975) 19 U.S.C. § 1330(b)
(1982). This responsibility went directly to the ITC, as did the injury determination responsibility for dutiable merchandise when that was instituted by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
P.L. 96-30, 93 Stat. 144 (1979), 19 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). This pattern of agency responsibility
began with Treasury because of its duty-collection function. The injury determination eventually was lodged with the ITC because of its economic expertise. Treasury's functions then
were shifted to Commerce.
44. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979 (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures), and Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (relating to antidumping measures), reprintedin AGREEMENTS REACHED INTHE
TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. Pt. 1, 259-306 and 309-337 (1979). These agreements evince an explicit preference for
simultaneous investigation of injury and of substantive violations, i. e., subsidies or less than fair
value sales. Subsidies Code, Art. 2 para. 4; Antidumping Code, Art. 5 para. 2.
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merce. Title VII cases, like their Section 337 counterparts, are in every
realistic sense, legal proceedings. 45 They proceed according to statute and
implementing regulation, and they develop a judicially reviewable record.
Responsibility for reaching a judicially reviewable determination on that
record is best left to an agency such as the ITC.46
The Department of Commerce cannot escape the fact that it is widely
perceived as a political entity. How could the perception be otherwise?
After all the Secretary of Commerce is a political appointee whose responsibility it is to develop and to implement commercial policies. Quite properly
the Secretary hears and promotes within government the position of U.S.
industry.47 His subordinates responsible for the enforcement of Title VII
cannot always be expected to be totally unaffected by such considerations,
although certainly they try. 48 Regardless of their success, the perception of
improper political influence remains-especially in the eyes of the foreigners who are the subject of Title VII investigations. By assuming that the role
of the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and his subordinates is the same as their

45. The fact that the President may disapprove an ITC order in a § 337 proceeding does not
change its legal character, which is that of an adjudicatory proceeding under the Administrative
Procedures Act 5 U.S.C. Ch. 5 Subch. II. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982).
46. The Commission "is an independent and quasi-judicial agency that conducts studies,
reports, and investigations, and makes recommendations to the President and the Congress on
a wide range of international trade issues." Staff of Subcomm. on Trade, Comm. on Ways and
Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PROVISIONS OF U.S. TRADE LAW 137
(Comm. Print, 1984).
47. The mandate of the Department of Commerce includes the promotion of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States. Id. at 133.
48. For example, the subject of political considerations was raised in an interview with the
then outgoing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, Alan
Holmer:
Q: My final question concerns allegations by some critics of the department that Commerce, like Treasury before it, does not vigorously enforce the dumping and countervailing
duty statutes. Moreover, the critics maintain that Commerce sometimes makes decisions
which are political in nature, such as finding in the negative with regard to countries that the
United States does not want to antagonize or in the affirmative in instances where we wish to
make a point with regard to a particular industry or country. What is your response to this?
A: First, decisions are made here absolutely without regard to foreign policy or domestic
political considerations. We are frequently called by other departments or agencies to receive
status reports on cases, but we are never called with a request that we decide a case a
particular way for one reason or another.
2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1019 (Aug. 7, 1985).
The matter came up more pointedly in Lightweight Polyester Filament Fabric From Japan;
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 49 Fed. Reg. 472 (1984) in which
respondents maintained that "reversals in policy guidelines and burdensome, last-minute
requests for information" raised the question of whether the proceeding had been "tainted by
legislative interference." Commerce responded: "It is not unusual for there to be a degree of
Congressional interest in our determinations, this case being no exception. Notwithstanding
whatever legislative interest there may have been in this case, all of our decisions throughout
the course of the investigation were based upon the Act and our regulations as applied to the
facts of this case." Id. at 479.
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counterparts in the foreigner's government, the foreign subject of the investigation may fear adverse political influence or may hope for favorable
political influence. 49 Either way, the problem is best avoided by assignment
of the function to the quasi-judicial, independent ITC.

D.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS: COUNTERVAILING

DUTY

PROCEEDINGS

Application of the Section 337 model to countervailing duty cases might

present some problems that do not occur in application of the model to
antidumping investigations. The problems would arise from the fact that
countervailing duty investigations involve programs of sovereign foreign
governments in their governmental capacity 50 while antidumping investigations involve the pricing practices of individual firms. Thus, while the private
U.S. petitioner in an antidumping investigation would make its case, and
conduct its discovery, against a foreign commercial firm, in a countervailing
duty proceeding in the proposed Section 337 format, by contrast, a private
U.S. petitioner would, in effect, be hauling a foreign government into
court.5 1 The private petitioner would be conducting discovery of the foreign
government, including, possibly taking sworn depositions from government
officials. In short, in a Section 337 style countervailing duty proceeding, a
foreign government in effect would be a party to private litgation before a
quasi-judicial U.S. tribunal, and, eventually, should the cases be appealed,
before the courts of the United States.5 2
49. The author once had the experience of explaining U.S. countervailing duty procedures
to an official of a foreign government in the course of a countervailing duty investigation of that
government's programs. The official was exceedingly skeptical of the author's assurances that
the matter would be decided on the facts and the law and not on political considerations. But the
Secretary of Commerce is a political official, the foreign official observed. Of course he would
make a political decision, as would his counterpart in any other country. It is true that the
Secretary of Commerce is a political official, the author conceded, but the decision in these
cases was delegated by the Secretary to others in the Department. The foreign official remained
skeptical, and reviewed the chain of command: Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary and so on. "At what point in the chain," the foreign official
asked, "does the law-enforcing subordinate tell the policy-making superior to go to hell?" The
author suggested a point where this might occur, but the official did not seem convinced.
50. The problems, therefore, are different from those addressed by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982), which deals with the commercial activity
exemption to the general rule that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.
51. A "private" petitioner is the only kind of petitioner there is. Only an "interested party"
may file a countervailing duty petition. Tariff Act § 702(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(c)(D)(E)
(1982). However, government possesses the seldom, if ever, used authority to initiate countervailing duty investigations without a petition. 19 U.S.C. § 702(a).
52. The Tariff Act § 771(9)(B) also provides that foreign governments are included within
the term "interested party." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(B) (1982). As such, they may invoke the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to appeal the results of investigations in which they participated. 19
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There are at least two answers to the problem: the first is that essentially
the same thing already occurs under the administration of Title VII by the
Department of Commerce-questions, very detailed questions, are put to
foreign governments in the ordinary course of countervailing duty
investigations; 53 strict time limits for responses are imposed on those
governments; 54 Department of Commerce officials travel to the foreign
country, meet with and question foreign government officials in order to
verify the truth of the government response, and examine the records of that
government. Little in fact would occur under the supposed Section 337
model that does not already occur under the present administration of Title
VII.
The present Title VII procedures, of course, could be viewed as a major
invasion of the sovereignty of foreign governments, but it is an invasion that
foreign governments themselves permit. 56 Submission to the strictures of
U.S. countervailing duty law procedures may be seen as a voluntary, albeit
necessary, condition of doing business in the U.S. market. Through the
Subsidies Code, governments already have established certain ground rules
for the application of domestic countervailing measures to each other's
programs.57 Presumably they could do the same to further the development
of an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system.
A second answer to the problem of private party intrusion of foreign
governmental sovereignty might be the role of the ITC staff attorney as a
party to the proceeding. Use of the staff attorney as an intermediary in the
serving of discovery requests might help cast the procedure into more of a

U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) (1082). The Tariff Act thus makes explicit what the Supreme Court found
implicit as to whether a foreign sovereign is a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages under
the antitrust laws. Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, reh. den. 435 U.S. 910 (1978).

53. See, e.g., supra note 9, where questionnaire consisted of 44 single-spaced typewritten

pages.

54. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
55. Verification of all information relied upon in making a final determination is required. 19
U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Moreover, confidential information submitted by a
foreign government to the U.S. government in the course of an investigation is not immune
from disclosure: "The Court of International Trade may order that . . . any information
provided to the United States by any foreign government or foreign person, may be disclosed to

a party, its counsel, or any other person under such terms and conditions as the court may
order." 28 U.S.C. § 2641(b) (1982).
56. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, Art. 2, para. 8, (relating to subsidies
and countervailing measures), supra note 43, provides: "The investigating authorities may
carry out investigations in the territory of other signatories as required, provided they have
notified in good time the signatory in question and unless the latter objects to the investigation.
Further, the investigating authorities may carry out investigations on the premises of a firm and
may examine the records of a firm if (i) the firm so agrees and (ii) the signatory in question does

not object."
57. Subsidies Code, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
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government-to-government than a private party-to-government matter.
Perhaps this could be done through a requirement that discovery requests to
a foreign government be made through the staff attorney. Care would have
to be taken to avoid the staff attorney's becoming a mere conduit for private
petitioners on the one hand, or an obstacle to petitioners' opportunity for
fair prosecution of their own cases on the other. Perhaps this could be done
by establishing guidelines as to the authority of the staff attorney to reject
discovery requests either as too burdensome, too intrusive, not relevant etc.
as a whole
A rapid review of any refusal by the ALJ or the Commission
58
might be necessary to protect a petitioner's interest.
VI. Conclusion
Perhaps a fundamental error occurred in the 1970s with the abandonment
of the original idea of the Antidumping Act of 1921-the idea that a Cabinet
officer would make a policy decision as to the fairness of the conduct of
foreigners in international trade, a decision made without "benefit" of
forty-four page questionnaires and extensive judicial review. 59 Determinations in large measure were more trade policy than trade law. But regardless
of the wisdom of the change in course, the countervailing and antidumping
duty toothpaste is out of the tube and is not likely to be replaced. Litigation,
not policy, is now the format. This being the case, it only makes sense to seek
the fairest litigation system available commensurate with the peculiar needs
of international trade regulation. The inquisitorial system has been described by a Japanese scholar as "no less hideous to the modern mind than
the similar method employed during the Tokugawa regime." 60 It does not
behoove a nation whose notions of procedural fairness are rooted in the Bill
of Rights, and in the opinions of a Holmes or a Brandeis, to utilize a system
in which Tomas de Torquemada and Ieyasu Tokugawa would be more than
comfortable. If we insist on turning trade policy into trade law, we should
make sure that the procedural protections of our law are not abandoned in
the process.

58. A foreign government, of course, like any party, could refuse to comply with a discovery
request and oppose a motion to compel.
59. See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 19, at 1365.
60. K. Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 18681961, reprintedin TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 163,168 (1984). Ieyasu Tokugawa was
shogun, or supreme warlord, of Japan in the 17th Century. See E. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE
64-67 (1977).
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